Pakistan’s National Security Dilemma
According to a recent corporate announcement VEON, the parent company of JAZZ, has partnered with STARLINK to launch Direct-to-Cell satellite services in VEON-operated markets, aiming to expand connectivity to remote and underserved areas. Jazz is Pakistan’s leading mobile network and digital services provider. This collaboration will integrate Starlink’s technology into Jazz’s network, allowing for mobile communication in regions without traditional cellular infrastructure. Although the partnership has been announced, specific rollout plans for Pakistan are not yet detailed beyond the agreement itself. In fact, it is not yet known whether this association may be rolled out at all in Pakistan as it has not been so announced.
Originally headquartered in Amsterdam VIMPELCOM with a name change now to VEON, is a digital operator registered in Dubai, but owned primarily by Luxembourg registered LETTERONE, providing services to over 150 million connectivity customers and approximately 120 million monthly active digital users. Operating across five countries that are home to more than 6% of the world’s population, VEON is transforming lives through technology-driven services that empower individuals and drive economic growth. The many locations of registration is primarily to avoid taxes, sanctions and restrictions due to nationalities. Many companies in the world, VEON included, have layers of corporate structures with different registrations at different locations to hide the real ownership. One of the co-foundBettina Robotka ers, alongwith US Citizen Augie Fabela II, of the original parent company of VEON, LETTERONE is the very visionary Ukrainian – born Russian – Israeli oligarch, Mikhail Fridman, the founder of ALFA GROUP Russia’s largest non-state bank. This bank was targeted by western sanctions after Russia invaded Ukraine. Because of this, Fridman reduced his shareholding in the Luxembourg company LETTERONE. Incidentally Mike Pompeo, Trump’s Secretary of State in his first Administration and now out of favour with Trump, is a Board Member of VEON. Moreover, Fridman was indicted for fraud in Ukraine and put on the international watch list, what would the UAE authorities very sensitive to AML, etc, say to that? He then moved to Israel where he still lives but is believed to be planning to go back to Russia.
Even though he is on record that “war is not the answer” with respect to Ukraine, Mikhail Fridman has not publicly commented on the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel or the subsequent war in Gaza. However, his actions and public statements surrounding his Jewish identity, connections to Israel, and his reaction to other conflicts provide relevant context. There is no truth to the allegation that he suggested Israel go to war in Gaza, but as an Israeli citizen he holds strong views on Israel; staunchly supporting Shoah education, as shown by his backing of a UK project to preserve survivors’ testimony. His aim to preserve and maintain Jewish life globally is not just a defence mechanism, it is also a positive recipe for living.
He argues that “certain Jewish traditions, values or philosophy” add up to “a very powerful source for achieving success in life”.
How technology can be misused by mobile networks was seen on 17 and 18 September 2024, when thousands of handheld pagers and hundreds of walkie-talkies in use by Hezbollah exploded simultaneously in two separate events across Lebanon and Syria, in an Israeli attack nicknamed “Operation Grim Beeper”. The attack took out of action 1,500 Hezbollah fighters of middle level and senior level command cadres due to injuries. The Israeli intelligence agency Mossad had secretly manufactured and integrated the explosive PETN into the devices, and sold them to Hezbollah through a shell company in Hungary.
The question which telecom network was used to cause the beepers to blow up has not been answered but the question for any security agency in the world to answer is, should we risk some other such clandestine action that will decapitate command and control? Targeting our mobile nuclear assets which they can track in realtime?
STARLINK is a satellite internet constellation operated by Starlink Services, LLC, an international telecommunications provider that is a wholly owned subsidiary of American aerospace company SpaceX owned by Elon Musk, providing coverage to around 150 countries and territories.
It also aims to provide global mobile broadband. The wealthiest (and probably commercially the brainiest) man in the world Elon Musk is the owner of the visionary entities Tesla, SpaceX, Neuralink, X (formerly Twitter) and xAI. Originally South African he is now an American citizen who used his wealth and innovation to mobilize the virulently anti-immigrant right wing of US politics to elect President Trump to an unprecedented second term of office. Starlink’s journey in Pakistan began in February 2022 when it first registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) and applied for a telecom license. The company received a temporary No Objection Certificate (NOC) in March 2025, which allows it to proceed with the licensing process.
Pakistan has been struggling with unstable connectivity and uneven access—particularly in rural and remote regions. Mobile broadband accounts for approximately 99 percent of existing internet connections, with fixed broadband penetration stagnating below 1 percent. This stark disparity has left many Pakistanis disconnected from the global digital economy, hindering educational opportunities, limiting healthcare access, and curtailing entrepreneurial potential.
These are the reasons why Elon Musk’s ambitious satellite internet service STARLINK is under serious consideration by Pakistani authorities hoping it could potentially herald a transformative era in digital connectivity, bridging Pakistan’s longstanding digital divides and carrying profound economic, social, and cultural implications. But regulatory issues, geopolitical tussles, and access concerns spell formidable challenges.
STARLINK offers a potential solution to these multi-sector connectivity woes by providing high-speed, low-latency internet access. Its constellation of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites bypasses traditional infrastructure constraints, presenting a game-changing opportunity for Pakistan’s traditionally underserved communities. Umar Saif, Minister for IT in the Caretaker Cabinet, was a very strong supporter of inducting Starlink in Pakistan at any cost.
The present Federal Minister for IT and Telecom confirmed in March 2025 that Starlink’s temporary registration (NOC) had been approved by Pakistan but Starlink still awaits the finalization of licensing approvals from the Pakistan Telecommunication Agency (PTA).
This approval process involves determining pricing structures and may include reviewing how Starlink uses radio frequencies to transmit data (spectrum usage) and ensuring its satellites operate in harmony with others in orbit to avoid signal or path conflicts (satellite coordination), along with basic compliance with national Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) policies.
Beyond regulatory and affordability concerns, Pakistani officials considering Starlink’s approval would also have to navigate substantial geopolitical complexities. For one, Starlink’s regulatory process is unfolding within the context of warming U.S.- Pakistan bilateral relations, characterized by high-level engagements and deepening cooperation across issue areas including trade, critical minerals, and energy.
While these developments may create more conducive political conditions for Starlink’s approval, Pakistani policymakers should evaluate the strategic implications of Starlink through a comprehensive national security and sovereignty framework that transcends immediate economic or diplomatic benefits. However, Pakistan planners must take into consideration that Elon Musk and President Trump have drastically fallen apart after Trump tried to rein in Musk’s exuberance in firing Federal Govt employees wholesale in a drastic effort to reduce the Federal workforce. Today Elon Musk is the most hated man among US Federal bureaucracy employees and very unpopular among Republicans and Democrats alike.
Regional competition should also likely weigh on Pakistan’s policy deliberations. Despite India’s historical concerns about foreign technology dependency, New Delhi decided to approve Starlink operations, signalling the importance of digital infrastructure advancement. But shortly before the escalation of the conflict with Pakistan in May 2025, India had introduced strict satellite regulations citing national security concerns, reflecting a significant shift in the geopolitical approach to satellite-based communication. These regulations require satellite data to be stored within India and subject to national interception and surveillance laws, highlighting the growing importance of state control over satellite infrastructure. India’s move to impose a 29-point compliance framework on satellite-based internet services, announced by the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) on May 5, 2025, exemplifies this significant shift from global governance of telecommunications infrastructure to national data sovereignty policies. These recent Indian regulations require domestic data storage, lawful interception access, and localization of at least 20% of ground infrastructure within five years. These measures are a response to concerns regarding Starlink’s possible operations in neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Undoubtedly, however, Pakistan’s strategic ties with China represent the largest confounding factor as policymakers consider Starlink’s entry. Most pressingly, China’s Shanghai Spacecom has put forward a competing application for operating licenses. But more broadly, Pakistan’s regulatory calculus is complicated by existing defence infrastructure dependencies, particularly the military’s integration with China’s Beidou Navigation Satellite System across critical applications. The technical architecture of Starlink’s GPS-dependent positioning systems presents potential interoperability challenges and security considerations for defence planners operating within Chinese satellite navigation ecosystems. China’s parallel development of satellite internet capabilities, including the Guowang constellation initiative, presents alternative technological pathways more aligned with Pakistan’s existing defence technology ecosystem.
However, the longer developmental timeline of these systems creates a policy dilemma: whether to defer connectivity improvements pending the maturation of Chinese alternatives or proceed with available U.S. technology while negotiating appropriate safeguards for sovereignty. The stakes of this policy dilemma are high—the extraterritorial nature of satellite systems, unlike domestically-controllable terrestrial infrastructure, introduces concerns regarding data sovereignty, traffic routing protocols, and potential surveillance vulnerabilities inherent in foreign-controlled space-based assets. The operational performance of Starlink supporting Ukrainian Armed Forces during the Russia-Ukraine conflict provides empirical evidence of satellite internet’s strategic utility in conflict scenarios, demonstrating resilience against infrastructure disruption and maintenance of critical communications when terrestrial networks are compromised. However, this same capability presents dual-use concerns for Pakistani defence planners, as centralized control mechanisms enable external actors to influence access during periods of geopolitical tension or even during war. Iran’s parliament has passed legislation criminalising the use of unlicensed electronic communication tools, including Starlink’s satellite internet services, with offenders facing various prison terms only 12 days after the unrestricted bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025.
During this conflict thousands of clandestine Starlink terminals had been smuggled into Iran to bypass wartime internet blackouts. The Starlink internet constellation had been used also in Israel’s war in Gaza. One can understand Elon Musk team with Augie Fabela II but is there by default of association on Elon Musk Mikhail Fridman connection? An example of the political use of Starlink by its owner Elon Musk is his order to halt Starlink access as Ukraine retook territory from Russia demonstrates direct involvement of Starlink owner Musk against Russia. Elon Musk has right-wing political leanings. Having a South African background, he is virulently racist and anti-Muslim. In November 2025, he was widely accused of racism after he mocked the name of Zohran Mamdani, a prominent Indian-American candidate for mayor of New York City. In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Musk deliberately misspelled Mamdani’s last name while urging people to vote for his opponent. The post read: “Bear in mind that a vote for Curtis is really a vote for Mumdumi or whatever his name is. VOTE CUOMO!”. As the owner of Twitter, he had been accused of suppressing critics and allowing the spread of misinformation. Only days before Germany’s snap election in early 2025 he life-streamed his chat with AFD frontwoman Alice Weidel while openly asking viewers to vote for her party. Following his involvement in European politics, Musk’s public statements have received criticism from several world leaders.
Jazz is one of the greatest successful corporate stories of Pakistan. It has always had Pakistanis in every position from the highest downwards. They have progressed from simply being a mobile telephone operator to a financial colossus with tremendous potential to expand into new commercial fields in Pakistan. Staffed entirely with Pakistanis with great patriotic, fervour, one can safely say that they will keep the national interest paramount over the corporate interest of VEON, their parent company. Hopefully they will not become like an East India Company like most MNCs in Pakistan tend to. A lot of what happens next in the STARLINK – VEON connection, particularly when it relates to national security and Pakistan, will impact on their loyalty to the country.
Whoever takes this matter forward has to keep in mind that with India negotiating with Elon Musk in a number of ventures this could mean a threat to the very existence of Pakistan. One hopes that elements of Pakistan’s security agencies dealing with this crucial matter do not get star struck by the wealth and influence of Elon Musk and Augie Fabela II, albeit through their commercial entities. Allowing foreign-owned, satellite-based communication systems to operate at scale, outside the full regulatory and monitoring reach of Pakistani institutions, creates potential vulnerabilities around the protection of sensitive national data, the security of critical digital infrastructure, and the safeguarding of strategic assets, including the nuclear command-and-control ecosystem that relies on uncompromised, sovereign communication layers.
Satellites operating with end-to-end encryption beyond national interception capabilities could allow hostile actors to mask information flows, manipulate digital narratives, conduct intelligence collection, or disrupt civilian and military networks. In a geopolitical landscape where data is the new battleground, Pakistan must critically evaluate how foreign telecommunications partnerships, particularly having a local partner with considerable financial clout to go with data, may inadvertently expand attack surfaces for espionage, cyber-interference, and influence operations, making it imperative that any such collaboration is governed under strict national security protocols, sovereign data hosting requirements, and full regulatory visibility to prevent strategic vulnerabilities.” The rise of satellite connectivity has initiated a rapid increase in relevant state regulation.
This results indirectly from the lack of dedicated, specific, binding international and national legal norms on the issue of telecommunications infrastructure regulations and data access. Governments worldwide and in Pakistan particularly must contend with the challenge of regulating foreign satellite infrastructures that become intrinsic parts of national communication systems and data flows.
The political and national security-related implications should not be overlooked. This presents national security dilemma for Pakistan as the Armed Forces zealously guard Pakistan’s nuclear potential and are not prepared to take any risks when Indian, Western and Israel interests are collaborating to try and destroy Pakistan’s nuclear assets.
