A condensed summary of Paul Staniland and Furqan Khan, “How Does China Manage Political Conflict Abroad? Insights from South Asia,” The Washington Quarterly 49:3 (Fall 2026)
China’s overseas investments are usually described in economic terms, but they are increasingly entangled in the politics of host countries. Political scientist Paul Staniland and PoliTact Great Power Politics Fellow Furqan Khan ask what happens when Chinese projects land where the host state does not control all of its territory. They focus on Pakistan and, more briefly, Myanmar, and map the tools Beijing is using or proposing to protect its interests. Their conclusion is that China’s expanding footprint is double-edged, as it creates opportunities but also risks pulling Beijing into conflicts it cannot control.
Key Takeaways
- Chinese influence in both countries is real, but local violence threatens the projects, infrastructure, and partner governments that China depends on. Deeper involvement in these wars is undesirable for Beijing yet hard to avoid.
- Insurgent groups and militias are serious political actors. The state lacks a monopoly on violence in strategically vital areas, so China must deal with armed groups whether they are hostile, friendly, or neutral.
- China is developing new tools: joint security mechanisms with host governments, Chinese-linked private security companies, and direct engagement with armed groups through mediation, negotiation, and pressure.
Pakistan: CPEC Under Fire
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the single largest investment under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), linking China’s Xinjiang to Pakistan’s Gwadar port. Pakistani officials counted roughly 20,000 Chinese nationals in the country as of December 2024. Chinese nationals and projects have been targeted since 2016, and since 2021, twenty Chinese citizens have been killed and thirty-four injured.
Pakistan insists CPEC itself has not been directly attacked, noting that many incidents hit other projects or Chinese travelers. The authors argue that numerous CPEC projects and Chinese workers have come under attack, prompting Beijing to adopt an assertive security posture. After a November 2024 suicide attack in Karachi killed two Chinese officials, China’s ambassador publicly called such attacks unacceptable and the biggest challenge facing CPEC.
To cut through these competing narratives, the authors built a new dataset covering both direct attacks on Chinese nationals and attacks on CPEC-related infrastructure, such as highways, construction machinery, and the forces guarding them. They count at least twenty-six direct attacks since 2016, causing twenty-seven Chinese deaths. Infrastructure attacks, which official statements and much of the existing literature overlook, are more common and rising sharply. At least thirteen were reported in 2024 alone, and the first half of 2026 matched the whole of 2023. Direct attacks on Chinese nationals have declined even as infrastructure attacks climb. Militants have grown bolder, blocking highways, setting up checkpoints, and launching larger coordinated assaults on transport corridors and security forces. The effects are tangible: work on the Tarbela 5th Extension hydropower project was suspended after five Chinese engineers were killed, and operations at Gwadar International Airport were delayed by attacks in 2024.
Who Is Attacking China?
The first category of attackers is ethno-nationalist groups in Balochistan and Sindh, chiefly the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). They view China as a partner of the Pakistani state and a neocolonial power extracting local resources. The Baloch insurgency, weakened by 2020, has rebounded since 2021, and in 2024 the BLA ranked second only to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) among terrorist threats to Pakistan. Islamabad’s heavy-handed response, including enforced disappearances, has further pushed demands from seeking autonomy toward full independence. The BLA has openly threatened Chinese interests and reportedly created a special unit to target Chinese officials and CPEC installations. Smaller Sindhi separatist groups have also carried out similar attacks in Karachi; however, about half of all attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan have been carried out by Baloch separatists.
The second category is jihadist groups, including TTP and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), motivated partly by anger over China’s treatment of Uyghurs and by the strategic benefits of hurting Chinese projects that are vital to Pakistan’s economic lifeline. Some deadly attacks, such as the 2021 Dasu bombing that killed nine Chinese workers, were traced to the TTP, though the group denied involvement. The TTP is increasingly active in Balochistan, but the authors find no evidence of a concerted TTP campaign aimed specifically at Chinese interests, as Pakistan remains its main target.
China’s Response in Pakistan
Beijing has responded on three fronts. First, it has pressured Islamabad through rare but blunt public statements and reports that further investment is on hold until the security situation for Chinese workers improves. Pakistan objected to China’s public criticism, but the two countries have reaffirmed their partnership and bilateral counterterrorism cooperation.
Second, China has reached out to local actors in Balochistan, a departure from its non-interference principle. A 2018 report described contacts with exiled Baloch separatists, which China denied. Beijing has also funded flood relief, offered scholarships to Baloch students, and hosted Baloch tribal elders in late 2024 to develop a “correct understanding of China” among the Baloch youth.
Third, and most significant, China has pushed for a joint security mechanism that would involve it more directly in Pakistan’s internal security through joint training, intelligence sharing, and working groups. Pakistan has repeatedly resisted, though officials have said the proposal is under consideration and talks are ongoing. Islamabad has instead expanded its own protection for Chinese citizens, with a Special Security Division of about 15,000 troops and paramilitary personnel and, in January 2026, an additional Special Protection Unit. If these measures fail, China is likely to seek a bigger role. The authors stress that China has little distinctive leverage over armed groups whose grievances go to the heart of Pakistan’s political system, so its economic resources cannot simply solve the problem.
Myanmar: War and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor
Myanmar offers a parallel case. The civil war that followed the military’s February 2021 coup has made it far harder to advance projects under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). Unlike in Pakistan, direct attacks on Chinese projects are relatively rare. The problem is pervasive violence in areas where projects are planned, and insurgents tend to cooperate with China or ignore it.
Beijing has pursued three strategies. First, it backs the military government, including by providing diplomatic cover for the elections of December 2025 and January 2026. Those elections were neither free nor fair and reportedly took place under Chinese pressure, even though China was unhappy with the coup itself.
Second, it works with and pressures armed groups, especially along its border. It supported 2023-24 rebel offensives that shut down scam centers victimizing Chinese citizens, and more recently pushed some groups to withdraw from strategic locations and accept ceasefires. It contributed, for example, to the MNDAA’s withdrawal from Lashio in April 2025. Border groups are not Chinese proxies, but they are vulnerable to its influence. Others, such as the Kachin Independence Organization, the Arakan Army, and the Karen National Union, are far less exposed to coercion, forcing China to hedge its bets in a situation it cannot control.
Third, China is exploring a local security presence. Myanmar has legalized foreign-owned private security firms, opening the door for Chinese-linked companies to guard infrastructure. This could protect investments without deploying troops, which would be unpopular in Myanmar and undesirable for Beijing, and it would free up Myanmar’s stretched military. Similar firms already operate in Central Asia. The risks are real, though: many projects sit in areas influenced or controlled by insurgents, so security firms may clash with them or have to cooperate with them.
China’s role is also costing it goodwill. A 2024 survey found 58 percent of Myanmar respondents held an unfavorable view of China, and a stakeholder survey recorded rising negative perceptions. Analysts cited by the authors say China’s efforts have pushed it deeper into Myanmar’s crisis and that its involvement is likely to grow.
Rising Powers and Unstable Politics
The authors place China’s experience in a long historical pattern. The United States and the Soviet Union both found that expanding commitments abroad brought influence and access but also drew them into local conflicts they could neither stabilize nor resolve. India and various Middle Eastern powers face similar dynamics today. China may follow the same path: its economic projects are inseparable from the politics of host states, and its ability to end insurgencies or stabilize fragile political systems is limited. Analysts should therefore avoid assuming that a larger Chinese presence automatically means greater power. Similar, though more muted, dynamics appear in Central Asia, where Chinese workers were killed in Afghanistan in January 2025 and in Tajikistan in November 2025.
China’s Toolkit
China has three main options. The first is state-to-state partnership, including diplomatic support, security consultation, arms sales, and economic aid. The second is engagement with non-state armed actors, which is murkier and less publicized but crucial. The third is Chinese-owned or linked private security. Together, these give Beijing flexibility, but none is a decisive leverage in resolving these challenges. State support has had limited effect because many threats come from groups opposed to the host governments, and private security firms are both symbols of Chinese influence and potential vulnerabilities, since attacks on them could draw China in deeper.
Conclusion
The authors urge scholars and policymakers to look beyond state-to-state relations and take seriously the messy domestic politics, including armed groups that control territory, that shape what rising powers can achieve abroad. Economics is embedded in politics, and in Pakistan and Myanmar, China is learning that economic and infrastructure development do not insulate it from the conflicts around it.
