Introduction
The Australian Defence Policy has seen many phases. The major challenge has been to strike the balance between the need to defend the continent or the defence of wider strategic interests. Being part of British Empire, the defence policy was to contribute to imperial defence till end of World War II (WW II). However during WWII, due to non-availability of Australian Forces for defence of continent against Japanese attacks, it sought help from US. This marked the turning point of Australian defence policy from British imperial defence to US defence ally in case of ANZUS and SEATO. The era upto late 1960s is considered ‘Forward Defence’ as Australian Forces had been deployed to defend wider strategic interests. After the Vietnam War and British withdrawal from East of Suez, Australia sought self-reliance for defence without immediate support from allies, termed as ‘Defence of Australia’. In order to analyse whether these two terms correctly describe evolution of Australia’s strategic policy, and provide a useful prism to defence policy challenges today, initially both the era have been analysed in terms of strategic situation and values and motivation of political party in power. Thereafter, challenges of rising Asia and changing demographic patterns of Australian society have been discussed with their relation to future defence policy. The time frame of data has been limited to 2030. It has been argued that for a coherent future defence policy, it should be aligned with rising Asia and changing demographic patterns of society.
Concept of Forward Defence
The concept of Forward Defence has many definitions. ‘In its strictest sense it means the deployment of forces across the approaches to Australia to prevent a potential enemy reaching Australia’.2 For similar purpose, elements of Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) were deployed in Malaya, New Britain, Timor and New Guinea and Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was deployed with Royal Navy (RN) in World War II (WW II). After the WW II, Australian forces were deployed in Japan as British Commonwealth Occupation Force. The policy to support the allies was not limited to region only. RAAF aircraft were deployed to break Berlin blockade in 1948-49 and in Malta in 1950s. The post war defence policy was announced on 4 Jun 1947. It allowed permanent army to be raised for the first time and expansion in RAAF and RAN. These changes enabled Australian Government to use armed forces to pursue its foreign policy objectives. Outbreak of Cold War, emergency in Malaya, Korean and Vietnam Wars witnessed the employment of Australian Forces in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. These participations were manifestation of strategic appreciation of the time. Although it was assessed that geographic isolation was the primary defence for Australia, however, limited economic and industrial capacity required dependence on an external ally in the hour of need. Australia also signed Australia New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) treaty in 1951 and South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 to fortify its defence by collective defence arrangements.
These defence policies were developed to cater for threat of nuclear armed Soviet Union, communist victories in Eastern Europe and China and a haunting theory of ‘Domino Effect’.3 The deployments of forces were either to deal with real threats as in case of communist insurgency in Malaya or perceived Chinese threat to Thailand in case of SEATO. Later on, Australian Forces also contributed to Malaysian stability in late 1960s which strengthened regional peace and stability. The concept of Forward Defence was aligned to Australian tradition of relying on alliances for security as in case of Britain or US. It is considered to be an attempt of ‘storing goodwill with an ally which might be called upon for help sometime in future’.4
The policy of Forward Defence had its own advantages and disadvantages. It allowed governments to focus on economic development rather than maintenance of large armed forces. The deployment of forces in Malaya contributed to the long term stability and peace in the region. In purely military terms, Australian forces learnt from the experiences of Britain and US. However, on the other hand these policies restricted Government’s abilities to form independent foreign policy and limited choices to participate in other countries’ wars. The structure of the armed forces was also required to be compatible with allies for better interoperability. These developments posed problems in independent defence of Australia. The concept of ‘Forward Defence’ is often seen as the product of imperial or global tendencies, however, it is also argued that it is in response to regional security concerns in Asia. Major factors in evolution of concept of ‘Forward Defence’ were security challenges after the end of WWII. Decolonisation and spread of communism around the globe led to a complex strategic environment. The focus of the policy was to keep UK and US engaged in the region in order to deal with security challenges posed to Australia.
Transformation to Defence of Australia
Forward Defence did not last longer and by early 1960s, difference of opinion prevailed on regional issues especially Indonesia. Due to various reasons, US and UK also reviewed their strategic posture in the region which was considered unsustainable. These circumstances led to concept of Defence of Australia, which means that ‘the principal function of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and the core basis for choosing its capabilities, is the defence of the Australian continent from direct military attack, and in particular the ability to do so against any credible level of attack without relying on the combat forces of our allies – the self-reliant defence of Australia’.5 The policy evolved during mid to late 1960s. However in 1976 White Paper, Australian Defence transformed the concept into policy without any doubt. Hence without declaring its intents, the Robert Menzies government transformed ADF into a force which could defend Australia without external support. The military procurement was also indicative of the policy shift, hence Oberon class submarines, Guided missiles destroyers, M-113 Armoured Personnel Carriers , F-111, Mirage III, C-130 Hercules, and DHC-4 Caribou aircraft and UH-1H Iroquois Huey helicopters were acquired. The conscription was also introduced.
By 1965, the foundations of firm defence of Australia without external support were laid. These changes were well in time as during subsequent decades, the strategic situation changed drastically. One of the major changes was succession of Sukarno with Suharto in Indonesia. This change was considered to be turning Indonesia ‘from a strategic liability into net asset to Australia’.6 This development transformed South East Asia from crises to progress and development. The second major change in international environment came in 1970 with the opening of China, US acceptance of Chinese regime and establishment of détente between US and USSR for international stabilization. Withdrawal of British Forces from East of Suez, US disengagement from mainland Southeast Asia, formation of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN),7 independence of Papua New Guinea,8 strategic parity between USA and USSR and less threatening China had changed the strategic situation. All these developments led to feeling of safety and respite to Australia and marked the end of Forward Defence era. This was accompanied by a good and bad developments. On the good side the region was less threatening while on the bad side, traditional allies had signalled that Australia has to deal with the residual problems without their support.
New strategic environment demanded new defence policy commensurate to the changing scenario. This was considered to be ‘most active and informed defence debate … [involving] universities, press and the government’.9 The strategic policy paper published in 1972 by McMahon Government included, ‘Australia would be prudent not to rest its security as directly or as heavily, as in its previous peacetime history, on the military power of a Western ally in Asia’.10 These concepts conclusively established the new defence policy. The 1976 Defence White Paper was a manifestation of this concept. The first chapter adequately highlighted the birth of new era: ‘The changes mentioned above … constitute a fundamental transformation of the strategic circumstances that governed Australia’s security throughout most of its history’.11 The Defence White paper argued that all these strategic changes demanded maritime region and countries in South West Pacific, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and South East Asia to be prime concern to Australia. The concept of Defence of Australia further matured in subsequent White Papers and also focussed on self-reliance. The most comprehensive expression of the policy was during 1986 Paul Dibb Review and the 1987 Defence of Australia White Paper. Due to shift towards self-reliance, focus was on investments in defence capabilities.12
The 1994 Defence White Paper Defending Australia explained government’s intent to manage defence in 21st century. The paper recognised that Australian future security was ‘linked inextricably to the security and prosperity of Asia and Pacific’.13 The focus of the strategy was on regional engagements and defence force structures to meet essential roles for defence of Australia. Since 1986 Dibb Review, the major review of the policy occurred in 2000 Strategic Review which recognised that Australia’s future security and prosperity was linked to wider region. East Timor reflects the manifestation of this outward looking policy. The beginning of 21st century brought Australia’s Strategic Policy at crossroads because of demanding requirements of community support in natural disasters at home and abroad as well as in international peacekeeping missions.14
Effects of 21st Century Chaos
After attack on World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, Australia joined US led coalition in Global War on Terror. ADF had been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The pull-out from Afghanistan is scheduled in 2014. In March 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd expressed his foreign policy aspirations of ‘middle power diplomacy’, and would ‘influence international decision-makers’ on global issues.15 The major change in first decade of 21st century occurred in 2009 Defence White Paper which recognized China as the potential threat and an ambitious list of defence procurement was listed to become middle power. The latest White Paper has been released in May 2013. Richard Brabin-Smith argues that Defence of Australia policies till to date are characterized by self-reliance, limits of Australian resources and influence, preference to operations close to home and level and discretion of contingency.16 In 2013 Defence White Paper, the potential Chinese threat has subsided and Southeast Asia has been described as the area of central concern in Indo-Pacific region. Although ANZUS treaty is still fundamental, Southeast Asia is described prior North Asia and Indian Ocean. The rise of Indonesia has also been addressed; ‘The security futures of Australia and Indonesia are described as ‘intertwined’. Major change from past practice, is the tendency to group Indonesia alongside other immediate neighbours, such as Papua New Guinea, East Timor and the micro-states of the South Pacific’.17
Hugh White argues that this shift in the policy is not new.18 The concept of Defence of Australia waned after 1914, when AIF participated in World War I. The same idea resurfaced in 1960s after the failure of ‘forward defence’. Moreover, there is criticism on the policy of Defence of Australia to be considered as isolationist and reactive.19 However, it is important to note that this policy evolved due to changing strategic scenario where traditional allies of Australia no longer shared the same view on regional threat perception. All these changes were reflective of the benign strategic environment of 1970s and 1980s as the Cold War was thought to be ended in the South East Asia and surrounding region.
Apart from the strategic circumstances, Justin Arnold argues that Defence policy has been based on the values and motivation of political party in power. He asserts that whether Labour or Liberal Party, both parties promoted their peculiar vision of Australian values to support their political interests. During 2001 election, Howard Government promoted their own values by declaring ‘We will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come’.20 These values were similar to the concepts of ‘Great Australian Settlement’ and Menzies Era based on fear of ‘Yellow Peril’ and ‘Red Menace’. Contrary to Howard, Kevin Rudd defence policy is promoting the Social-Democratic Liberal-Institutionalism in the region. Defence White Paper of 2009 is a manifestation of the same approach to change the strategic culture of Australian Defence Forces to secure Australian interests in Asia-Pacific Century by 2030.21 He argues that ‘strategic culture forms the basis of the application for the ADF of the government’s defence policy’ and ‘In the Australian policy contextualisation the values system which underpins our national defence policy ‘reflects variations on Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-American ideas about the use of force by liberal democratic societies’. It is argued that Labour Governments from Whitlam to Kevin Rudd has disregarded the imperial nature policies of forward defence and embraced the ‘value based nationalistic self-reliant’ approach.
Analysis of Strategic Policy
Analysis of the defence policy since 1945 reveals that Australian strategic circumstances included geographic isolation from all major powers of the world, large territory, small industrial base, small population and limited military capacity. Thus, Australia has to rely on powerful friends and allies for protection of its interests and territories. In exchange to this protection, Australian troops were deployed all around the world initially as part of British Empire and later on along with US forces. The decisions for such involvements were not a choice being part of British Empire; conversely, many wars fought with US were ‘wars of choice’. However, it can be argued that two factors contributed to participation in wars of choice. First factor was the shattering of belief that geographic isolation was the best defence for Australia.22 This was shattered with Japanese attacked on Darwin and sighting of Japanese midget submarines in Sydney Harbour. These incidents busted the myth of geographic isolation. The second factor was the availability of Australian Forces for defence of homeland in WW II. Despite threats to Australian mainland, British high command diverted Australian forces for defence of Burma. This fact necessitated US assistance for defence of Australia. Thereafter, the US assistance formed the bedrock of Australian defence policy. Both of these factors contributed to formulation of Forward Defence policies which were aligned to imperial loyalties and ‘White Australia Policy’. However, shift to Defence of Australia was the result of changing strategic scenario where imperial powers were no more interested in the region. After the beginning of Global War on Terror, the defence policy has shifted to Forward Defence to support coalition and ‘entente cordiale’ with US. These shifts in policy are due to changing strategic scenario and value system of political party in power.
Future Challenges and Available Options
In order to analyse whether Forward Defence and Defence of Australia are useful prism for looking at Australia’s main defence policy challenges today, it is important to review the changes in strategic situation for Australia. The strategic environment of future include rise of Asia and change in demographics of Australia. Although earlier defence policies have focused on alliance with Western Allies due to common affinity of heritage and threat perception, there are new challenges which affect the strategic policy of the future. The fact is the Asia is again rising. Apart from economic power, the military power is also rising. China will be richest country in the world. If all goes well, India will become the second richest country in the world after few decades demoting US to the third place in international ranking. Economic power forms the basis of national power. Apart from China and India, Australia’s closet neighbour Indonesia is also rising. Its economy is growing about 5% per year and three years ago its GDP surpassed Australian economy.23 It is first time in history that Indonesia is becoming powerful. By the mid of the century, Indonesia will be the fourth richest country in the world. These progress does not mean the military and economic might but it also means these countries will be powerful than traditional Australian allies.24 To recognize these global changes, the government commissioned Australia in the Asian Century White Paper. The paper recognizes ‘We are now seeing the most profound rebalancing of global wealth and power in the period since the United States emerged as a major power in the world’.25 However, the practical manifestation of this reality is not seen in the defence policy. Australia should have recognised that US had recognised China as a ‘peer competitor’ and Australian policies should keep their option open rather than choosing between US or China. However, Australia resorted to stationing US Marines in Darwin and signalled its intentions to remain firmly aligned to US irrespective of ‘Asian Century’. Hugh Whites describes this situation adequately
There is a problem with Australia’s vision of its future. On the one hand, we assume spent that China will just keep growing indefinitely …on the other hand, we expect America to remain the strongest power in Asia, the region’s natural leader and Australia’s ultimate protector. We will have a very nice future if both these things happen. The problem is that they cannot both happen at once …First, we need to accept that if China keeps growing, and it probably will, Asia will change. For Australia, foreign affairs and defence policy are getting serious again.26
The second issue is the concept of self-reliance and middle power. An independent and self- reliant defence capability is expensive to maintain. In order to acquire and maintain capabilities identified for a middle power 3-4% of GDP is required which is double than 2% being from last 20 years.27
The next issue is the changing demographic structure of Australia. From 1950 to 2006, Australian population has doubled and reached 22 million.28 ‘In 2006, 33.5% of the population was born overseas which included from ‘North-East Asia (8.9%), North-West Europe (7.5%), and South-East Asia (3.7%)’. The top ten countries of birth included UK, New Zealand, India, China, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Viet Nam, South Africa and Sudan.29 By 2030 Australian population is expected to reach 30.4 million and foreign born population ‘will increase nearly twice as fast as the Australian-born population accounting for 34.4% of the total population in 2030’.30 There is a need to evaluate how these changes affect the defence and foreign policy. ‘The ADF is one of the last of Australia’s social institutions still promoting the outdated conservative White Australia values system. Manning Clark has described that, ‘the enemy within and the enemy without’ is in need of dramatic reform’.31 By 2030, the demographic structure of the country will be substantially changed; it will require its reflection in the ADF. If ADF will be still ‘White Australia’ organization, it will not be true reflection of Australian society. Contrarily, if it will be an organization depicting true demographic structure of society, the threat perception of the people in ADF may not be same as in case of traditional Western Allies. In both cases, it represents a conflict in the aspiration of the people and state. So it is argued that in future, defence policy will have to be aligned with the aspiration of people in society and ADF.
In conclusion, the major challenge for Australian Defence Policy has to strike a balance between defence of continent and defence of wider strategic interests. In post WW II, era due to threat of communism and haunting memory of Japanese attack on Darwin, Australia relied on Forward Defence by participating in operations far from homeland. However, after the end of Vietnam War, the strategic situation changed and it has to resort to Defence of Australia till end of 20th century where it had to participate in Global War on Terror. These changes in policy were due to changing strategic circumstances as well as values of political party in power. But the challenge for future defence policy of Australia is to be aligned with new reality of rising Asia and multicultural Australia where treat perception may not be same as in case of traditional western allies.
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End Notes
2Australia – Asia Relations during Cold War, Forward Defence, 1. www.china-biz.org.
3’the domino theory was a foreign policy theory during the 1950s to 1980s, promoted at times by the government of the United States that speculated that if one land in a region came under the influence of communism, then the surrounding countries would follow in a domino effect. The domino effect suggests that some change, small in itself, will cause a similar change nearby, which then will cause another similar change, and so on in linear sequence, by analogy to a falling row of dominoes standing on end. The domino theory was used by successive United States administrations during the Cold War to clarify the need for American intervention around the world’. http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Domino_theorv.html
4Australia – Asia Relations during Cold War, Forward Defence, 1. www.china-biz.org.
5Hugh White, Four Decades of the Defence of Australia: Reflections on the Australian Defence Policy over the Past 40 Years.
6Hugh White, Four Decades of the Defence of Australia.
7‘The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) by the Founding Fathers of ASEAN, name ly Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam then joined on 7 January 1984, VietNam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999, making up what is today the ten Member States of ASEAN’. http://www.aseansec.org/overview/
8on 15 September 1975, almost 70 years of Australian governance, Papua New Guinea was granted independence. http://www.australianqeographic.com.au/journal/on-this-day-png gains-independence-from-australia.htm
9Hugh White , Four Decades of the Defence of Australia.
10stephan Fruehling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Services, 2009).
11Defence White Paper 1976 , Para 13 http://www.defence.gov.au/osccdf/se/publications/wpaper/1976_1.pdf
12Hugh White, Four Decades of-the Defence of Australia.
13Defence White Paper 1994, para 14
http://www.defence.gov.au/oscdf/se/publications/wpaper/1994.pdf
14Evolution of Australia’s Strategic Defence Policy,
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article92001?opendocument&tab-name=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2001&num=&view=
15Time to go global, urges Rudd, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/time-to-go- global-urges-rudd/story-e6frg6nf-1111115897302
16Four Principles of Australia’s Defence policy, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/four-principles-of-australian-defence-policy/
17Rod Lyon, The Southeast Asian emphasis in DWP2013, http://www.aspistrategist.orq.au/category/defence-white-paper-2013/
18Hugh White, Four Decades of the Defence of Australia.
19Hugh White, Four Decades of the Defence of Australia.
20Liberals accused of trying to rewrite history,
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2001/s422692.htm
21Michael Evans defines the strategic culture as referring to ‘a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat and use of force’ The Values and Motivations of Australian Defence Policy, Justin Arnold http://indymedia.org.au/2011/06/18/the-values-and-motivations-of-australian-defence-policy
22Evolution Of Australia’s Strategic Defence Policy, http://www.abs.qov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article9201?opendocument&tab-name=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2001&num=&view
23Hugh White, What Indonesia Rise Means for Australia: Northern Exposure http://www.themonthly.eom.au/issue/2013/june/1370181600/hugh-white/what-indonesia-s-rise-means-australia
24Hugh White, White-Papering the Cracks: A blue print for the Asian Century, December 2012. http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2012/december/1354762584/huqhwhite/white-papering-cracks
25Ken Henry to oversee blueprint for building Asian ties, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/ken-henry-to-oversee-blueprint-for-building-asian-ties/storv-fn59nm2j-1226150437420
26white, Hugh 2010, ‘Power Shift: Australia ‘s Future between Washington and Beijing’ Quarterly Essay, no. 39, 1-74
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/37931727
27Hugh White, A Middling Power: Why Australia’s Defence is all at Sea, http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2012/september/1346903463/huqh-white/middling-power
28Jane Nathan, Vision of a Greater Australia” Populate and Prosper, http://www.apop.com.au/pdf/PCA_Article_02082010.pdf
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